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IMSI-CATCHER DETECTION FOR MOBILE OPERATING SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
Systems and methods for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-
catcher are disclosed. The system includes a mobile device installed with an application that 
collects signal data and wirelessly transmits the data to a server. The application may be part of 
a remote attestation service and communicates directly with radio interface layer (RIL) to 
collect telephony network and diagnostic information data from the device’s baseband. The 
collected data is sent to the server for remote attestation. The method includes detecting 
anomalies in the signal data from crowd-sourced heuristics and notifying the device user 
discreetly of the presence of an IMSI-catcher. The system and method provide identification of 
IMSI catchers with high reliability since the detection is done using crowd-sourced data from 
many devices and on the server-side, it’s more difficult for an attacker to conceal being 
identified and to counter the detection.   
BACKGROUND 
Government agencies and other malicious actors currently use a device known as an 
IMSI-catcher to infringe on a mobile phone user’s privacy by eavesdropping on 
telecommunications and tracking their locations. Furthermore, law-enforcement agencies in the 
United States are permitted to use IMSI-catchers without a search warrant. These devices are 
used to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by acting as a “fake” mobile tower between the user 
and the cellular carrier’s actual mobile phone tower. These devices exploit vulnerability in the 
GSM standard whereby subscribers are required to authenticate to base stations, however base 
stations are not required to reciprocally authenticate to subscribers. IMSI-catchers force nearby 
subscribers to fall back to using the unencrypted A5/0 mode or the weakly encrypted A5/1 and 
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A5/2 modes for voice calls and SMS. Since SMS is often used for second-factor authentication, 
this vulnerability can also be used to assist in hijacking user accounts. 
IMSI-catchers can only operate under specific conditions, such as physical proximity to 
the targeted subscriber, higher signal strength than neighboring base stations and a call or SMS 
to be placed or received by the targeted subscriber. There are several IMSI-catcher detection 
applications available for use in various mobile operating systems. These applications are 
severely limited by the capabilities available on the operating system’s application layer APIs, 
especially to radio and telephony interfaces. As a result, many of these applications require 
superuser privileges on a device in order to function.  
DESCRIPTION 
Systems and methods for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-
catcher are disclosed. The system is depicted in FIG. 1 and includes a mobile device installed 
with an application in wireless communication with a server. The server includes a framework 
which detects anomalies in the cellular connectivity data and notifies the user discreetly. The 
mobile device may be running on any mobile operating system. The application may be part of 
a remote attestation service and communicates directly with radio interface layer (RIL) to 
collect telephony network and diagnostic information data from the device’s baseband. The 
collected data is compressed and sent to the server for remote attestation. The server includes a 
framework for crowd-sourced heuristics or machine learning classifier to detect anomalies. The 
crowd-sourced heuristics can include factors such as signal strength of other devices connected 
to the geolocated cell tower, mode of telephony, and if the account associated with device is 
being targeted by malicious actors, etc.  
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 FIG. 1: System for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-catcher 
The method as depicted in FIG. 2 includes collecting telephony network and diagnostic 
information from the device’s baseband by communicating directly with the radio interface 
layer (RIL) and sending compressed data packets to the server for remote attestation. The 
server decompresses the data and applies crowd-based heuristics or machine learning classifiers 
to detect anomalies and generates a score. If the score is above a certain threshold, the server 
notifies the user of the mobile device through discreet means, such as a predetermined 
notification, symbol or behavior to be displayed across devices. For instance, the notification or 
symbol may be an exclamation mark over the cellular status symbol on the top bar, or a text 
message informing the user that the calls and SMS may be eavesdropped on the cellular 
connectivity status indicator.  
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 FIG. 2: A method for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-catcher   
In one instance, when the user receives an incoming or places an outgoing call, the 
dialer displays bright red text explicitly notifying the user that traffic may currently be 
eavesdropped. Additionally, during the call a persistent notification may be presented 
informing the user that the presence of an IMSI-catcher has been discovered. If the user taps on 
the notification or cellular connectivity quick-tile, he/she will be presented with the option to 
disable cellular connectivity until the connection is safe. 
The disclosed system and method allows for crowd-sourced information to be used in 
detection as opposed to user data. Solving this problem at the platform level automatically 
bootstraps the data collection efforts from thousands of individual devices, as it is currently 
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done using application based IMSI-detectors, to hundreds of millions of devices distributed 
globally and all contributing crowd-based information. Since the identification is done using a 
server-side component, more CPU resources along with the additional data allows for more 
sophisticated and up-to-date detection of IMSI-catchers.  
The systems and methods have several advantages over application-level solutions. 
First, superuser privileges are not needed since the system is capable of collecting diagnostic 
telephony information from the baseband using without compromising the security model of 
the device. Second, the sources of data collected can more easily be updated at the system-level 
as opposed to the application-level especially since the user does need to grant additional 
permissions. This will provide additional privacy for users who are not aware of the 
vulnerability. Third, since detection is done server-side, heuristics can more easily be updated 
without requiring an update to the device. This not only improves the speed of updates, but also 
makes it more difficult for attackers to counter improvements made in the crowd-sourced 
detection and for an attacker to conceal being identified. Bulk data collection and server-side 
analysis of diagnostic information will make it harder for attackers to determine which signals 
are used in detecting IMSI-catchers. Lastly, solving this problem at the system-level will allow 
users to be notified using familiar and consistent methods just like all other security and 
privacy protections built into the operating system. 
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